Galaxy Serpent is a virtual, web-based international ongoing series of tabletop exercises designed to mature the concept of National Nuclear Forensics Libraries (NNFL) and illustrate their utility in answering investigative questions or providing investigative leads as part of an investigation involving nuclear or other radioactive material (R/N) out of regulatory control (MORC). Two prior versions of the exercise have been conducted; the first utilizing surrogate data for spent nuclear fuel as the material of interest, and the second using synthetic sealed radioactive source data. Teams participating in the recently concluded third version of the exercise were provided with synthetic uranium ore concentrate (UOC) data mimicking actual data characteristics (e.g. trace element concentrations), which was used to compile a model NNFL. Teams decided how to organize and interpret the data they were provided, dealt with real world features such as missing data, and assessed discriminating attributes. Next, a hypothetical scenario involving three UOC samples found out of regulatory control was provided, and each team had to assess the self-consistency of the individual sources in the unknown data, and employ their model NNFL as a comparative assessment instrument to determine whether the three UOC materials in question were consistent with any of the types of materials in their library. The design of the exercise, methodologies utilized by participating teams, and aggregate results of the exercise will be presented, along with challenges encountered and benefits realized.
Introduction
In 1995 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) to combat illicit nuclear trafficking and strengthen nuclear security. Through this voluntary reporting system, States are encouraged to report a variety of incidents, including those involving the transport of nuclear or other radioactive (R/N) material outside of regulatory control (MORC) across national borders. The ITDB thus provides a system allowing for information exchange and providing a way to potentially identify patterns and trends, within the limits of the data contained within it, among such incidents.
Between January 1993 and December 2018 there were almost 3500 reported incidents involving 80 radionuclides, a relatively small fraction of which were malicious in nature. While the number of reported incidents has risen from about 50/year from 1993-2004 to about 190/year from 2005-2018, this can be attributed to better detection techniques, a new and easier to use online reporting system, and an increased number of states joining this voluntary reporting system. ITDB reporting suggests that nuclear security of highly enriched uranium (HEU) has steadily improved since the 1990s with only one reported incident since 2011. At the same time, incidents taking advantage of a perceived demand for illicit material, including opportunistic scams seeking financial gain by marketing more pedestrian R/N material as something more desirable now form the majority of incidents connected with trafficking or malicious use. While encouraging, this highlights that the availability and illicit transport of R/N material remains an ongoing security challenge [1] .
Improved regulatory oversight and procedures for accountancy and control, including the deployment of border control and detection measures have helped to improve efforts to combat illicit trafficking. The international scientific community has further matured the discipline of nuclear forensics by conducting international material analysis exercises, meetings and trainings, and the development and refinement of analytical techniques. Nuclear forensics techniques can analyze interdicted R/N material to provide valuable information as to the history and origin of nuclear material, and the point of diversion, augmenting national nuclear security response plans for events involving MORC. A brief history of the field of nuclear forensics, and recent material analysis exercises convened by a leading organization in the discipline, have been previously reported [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] .
A critical tool to support an effective nuclear forensics capability is a collection of data and information regarding R/N materials in a given State's holdings. Developed into a suitable organized framework and informed by subject matter expertise, this constitutes a comparative instrument referred to as a National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL), hereafter denoted as a "Library." The definition of a Library has been the subject of continued discussion and refinement in the policy and scientific communities over the past decade, as evidenced by its evolution. A Library is not simply a database or a collection of information pertaining to a State's R/N material. Rather, the role of subject matter expertise in applying and interpreting the Library in a comparative analysis is inseparable. As such, the nuclear forensics community has come to understand a Library as being "composed of subject matter expertise and reference information on nuclear and other radioactive materials produced, used, or stored within a State that may be used to identify these materials" [7] .
The intent of this paper is to report on the results and lessons learned from the third version of the virtual, web-based international nuclear forensics technical tabletop exercise (TTX), Galaxy Serpent, intended to advance the concept of NNFLs. The three Galaxy Serpent exercises completed to date were conducted under the auspices of the National Nuclear Forensics Libraries Task Group of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) [8] , and funded and organized by the U.S. Department of State.
Galaxy Serpent was designed with the goal of raising awareness about the technical aspects of creating a Library and effectively utilizing it to answer investigative questions or suggest leads in support of an investigation involving MORC via a cost-effective, wholly web-based platform. Three versions of the Galaxy Serpent exercises have been conducted to date and are referred to as GSv1, GSv2, and GSv3, respectively. Prior work has detailed exercise design and play [6, 9] , and featured individual technical articles from nine of the participating teams in GSv1, which focused on surrogate spent nuclear fuel data [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , and for version 2, which used synthetic sealed radioactive source data [19] .
Galaxy Serpent version 3 (GSv3), the subject of this paper, focused on uranium ore concentrate (UOC) as the material of interest. The exercise involved 29 teams of scientists from 21 countries and two international organizations, with several countries having multiple teams. In Phase 1, teams were provided synthetic UOC source data developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), which they each used to compile a model NNFL. In Phase 2, this Library served as a comparative instrument to assess whether data injected in a hypothetical scenario involved MORC was consistent with the constructed Library. Teams were also asked to respond to mock investigative questions, utilize the provided information to generate investigative leads, report their findings, and evaluate the confidence underlying these results, which is discussed in this paper.
Theory

Exercise design
Specific design principles have guided the development of surrogate datasets for each version of the Galaxy Serpent exercises. The third version, the subject of this paper, incorporated these and additional elements in order to make a robust and instructive dataset mirroring real world data characteristics while remaining manageable for the purposes of the exercise. Building on prior Galaxy Serpent exercises, uranium ore concentrate (UOC) was selected as the material of interest for the third version. Development of a synthetic UOC dataset was pursued due to the sensitive and proprietary information of existing datasets and to allow transfer to exercise participants. To provide the greatest benefit, a realistic dataset mimicking UOC and preserving elemental covariance and data characteristics while infusing real-world features and uncertainties was developed. Great care was taken to prevent the loss of essential data attributes and to avoid introducing statistical distortion. Guiding the design effort was a desire to create a dataset that was large enough so as not to lend itself to simplistic analysis, yet still manageable so as not to unnecessarily overburden teams.
A surrogate forensic signature dataset for UOC was developed based on real trace element data for a similar geologic material, basalt. Basalt comprises more than 90% of all volcanic rock on the Earth, and is a fine-grained extrusive igneous mafic rock, signifying its formation from the fast cooling of magnesium-rich and iron-rich lava extruded at or very near the surface of the Earth. Due to its low silica content, basaltic lava has a low viscosity resulting in lava flows that can spread over large areas before rapid cooling and solidification on land or in the ocean.
Like UOC, there are several important sub-classes of basalt that can be distinguished based on their trace element compositions. To create the surrogate GSv3 dataset, basalt data was transformed into 'UOC data' using a few simple relabelling and mathematical operations. Basalt is approximately 45% silicon dioxide (SiO 2 ) by weight (wt%), while UOC is approximately 75% natural uranium (U) by weight, so 30% was added to the SiO 2 values, and the original SiO 2 data field relabelled as uranium by weight (wt%). Basalt also has other major elemental constituents, such as aluminium, calcium and magnesium, while UOC does not, so the concentrations for these elements were changed from their 'wt%' concentrations reported for basalt into 'parts per million' concentrations for the surrogate UOC data. Rare earth elements, which can be a key discriminator for UOC, were included among elemental concentrations. Finally, the U concentration in the basalt data (initially in the parts per billion range) was relabelled to 'Si', which is approximately correct for UOC. By making these simple changes, the basalt data was transformed into a dataset that resembled UOC data while retaining real world elemental covariance.
It was deemed that four classes, or affinities, of UOC would be an appropriate number for the Galaxy Serpent exercise, as this led to a tractable number of sources that would be challenging but not overwhelming to sort out, as per design principles. The dataset was made sparse and intentionally included missing data fields to allow experimentation with null values. The original data was sourced from many laboratories and determined to have within-class variation that was much greater than the associated analytical uncertainty, so no measurement uncertainties were provided. In order to vet the exercise data, it was necessary to conduct extensive testing and validation to ensure that the problems set out in the exercise would be sufficiently challenging, but not impossible, within the time constraints of the exercise. It was anticipated that many different analytical approaches would be taken for this exercise, and as a result the dataset would need to be especially robust. First, the data were extensively characterized, making sure that the samples were chemically consistent, well-behaved and separable by key index elements. Outliers were discarded from the dataset. Trace element discrimination within principal component analysis (PCA) space demonstrated that the four classes are separable and distinct from one another, but with somewhat overlapping compositions, first without pre-processing and later with pre-processing, to introduce a challenging quality.
Several other multivariate statistical techniques were also employed to make sure the data was sufficiently separable for the purposes of the exercise. The expected timeframe for someone with a background in data assessment, but unfamiliar with the dataset, to conduct a rudimentary analysis and complete the exercise was ascertained to match the exercise parameters. For the purpose of the exercise, three unknown samples were to be queried against the Galaxy Serpent UOC database. These three unknowns were chosen to include: (a) one clearly sourced from one of the known classes; (b) an outlier to one of the known classes; and (c) one not represented in the dataset. Additional testing was required to ensure that these unknowns were solvable.
Experimental
Exercise play
The GSv3 exercise was designed to enable teams to use nonsensitive provided synthetic UOC data, allow them ample time to work on provided tasks, and devise interpretation and operationalization methods based upon provided data and injects. To facilitate these and other features during exercise play, a password protected, web-based portal was used because it allowed relatively easy accessibility for all participating teams, did not involve travel or material transport costs or analytical measurements, and enabled teams to anonymously communicate to discuss the TTX if desired [20] . A tabletop exercise format requiring physical meetings was impractical since the assigned tasks could not usually be completed within hours or days, the teams worked independently and at different paces, and the teams would not have adequate time to carefully think through simulated real-world challenges.
The GSv3 exercise allowed teams to use surrogate uranium ore concentrate (UOC) data based on altered basaltic core sample data acquired from geological deep sea missions to build capacity in organizing, assessing, and utilizing a Library. Teams were provided with four classes, or affinities, comprising 822 records, each with 45 fields (analytes, or constituents of a substance to identify and measure). The fields included elemental concentrations but no isotopic compositions as teams were told to assume natural composition of uranium isotopics; approximately 99.274% U-238, 0.721% U-235, and 0.005% U-234. Deriving from the origin of the source data, the classes were coded as IAB, OIB, MORB, and ZCRFB, signifying their geological classification as, respectively, island arc basalt, ocean island basalt, mid-ocean ridge basalt, and Columbia River flood basalts. For the purposes of the exercise, this mimicked four geologically distinct and differentiable sources of UOC.
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The dataset was designed to mimic realistic UOC data. The dataset was sparse and included blank fields to allow experimentation by team in dealing with null values. Measurement uncertainties were not provided as teams were told to assume that elemental variation within each class was assumed to be much greater than any associated analytical uncertainty.
By providing surrogate data to Galaxy Serpent participants, teams experienced the process of developing a model NNFL by organizing provided data and information in a framework that involved subject matter experts and helped develop, mature, and self-assess capabilities. After being provided the synthetic UOC information and data, teams were given 6 weeks for Phase 1 in which to develop their model NNFL, and were encouraged to share approaches or methodologies. Some teams completed Phase 1 within days, while others utilized additional time beyond that allotted for a variety of reasons. In Phases 2a and 2b, a hypothetical scenario involving three barrels of UOC recovered outside of regulatory control was posited. Material in the three barrels was labelled as unknowns 53023, 8615-OSF-1, and 1005. Unknown 53023 was intended to be clearly sourced from one of the four known classes; 8615-OSF-1 to be an outlier to the same known class; and 1005 was designed to be not represented in the dataset, but to be similar to different classes in different, isolated ways, providing additional challenges for participants.
All teams received the same mock data for the Library (Phase 1) and recovered material (Phases 2a and 2b). Teams used the model NNFL developed in Phase 1 to assess whether the materials found were consistent with each other (Phase 2a), and with any of the four UOC classes in their model NNFL (Phase 2b). Exercise designers anticipated that in Phase 2a teams would find unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 to be of consistent origin, and unknown 1005 not to be consistent with the other two. In Phase 2b, the design intent of the exercise organizers was for unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 to be consistent with affinity IAB in their Library, and unknown 1005 to be inconsistent with any of the four classes represented in their Library.
At the conclusion of Phase 1 teams responded to several questions, including how they handled the intentionally missing data. In Phases 2a and 2b, teams were asked to provide answers to queries regarding their methodologies and challenges they experienced in completing the assigned tasks. They were also questioned as to what additional "missing" data or information might have been useful in answering the posed mock investigative questions, and to note the confidence they had in their reported results and the stipulations they would include.
Results and discussion
In Phase 1 of the Galaxy Serpent exercise teams were asked to organize provided surrogate UOC data into a model NNFL for the purpose of responding to questions posed by authorities in the course of an investigation involving R/N material. The data was derived and repurposed from open-domain geological deep sea core surveys for basaltic core samples. By design, the data set was sparse and featured missing elements in order to mirror characteristics of actual UOC data sets and to pose decisions and challenges to participants. Teams responded to prompts regarding the methodologies they used, and their efficacy, in leveraging distinguishing characteristics to discriminate between the four classes of samples represented in the data (IAB = island arc basalt; MORB = mid-ocean ridge basalt; OIB = ocean island basalt; ZCRFB = Columbia River flood basalts). Responses to exercise prompts were submitted by 22 of the 29 participating teams (76%). Those who did not submit reports either did not complete the exercise, continue to work towards completing the exercise, or opted to not submit a report for various reasons generally due to time constraints. Of those submitting reports, teams handled the significant amounts of missing data for specific elements in various ways.
The surrogate UOC datasets contains large portions of data missing from random places; full datasets were only provided for 30 of the 822 samples. Decisions and methodologies as to how teams dealt with missing data were often difficult to discern. Teams considered a variety of options including ignoring samples with any missing data, which none acted upon as it would have left teams with a Library utilizing only 30 samples, representing less than 5% of their provided sample data. The majority of teams appeared to have ignored missing elemental data while retaining all other analytes for a given sample.
The teams that opted to impute data into the gaps, used one of two methods: insert a dummy variable in place of the gaps, or replace missing values with the mean or median value of the set. The inputting of a dummy variable was not used by any teams as it was deemed not to be the best option for the size of the provided dataset. Imputing data using the mean or median method, while running the risk of reducing variance artificially, was thought to be the most reliable method by those opting for it as it allows the data to be interpreted by statistical analysis techniques. One team additionally observed that the latter method can be inaccurate if the gaps are not missing completely at random, which was a concern as large blocks of the data were missing from the lanthanides, something this team considered in reporting the confidence of their final assessment.
In response to Phase 1 prompts, teams noted several discriminating features allowing differentiation between the four classes. Primary among these was the rare earth element (REE) data, which was complicated by the large amounts of missing data among these elements. Teams also noted distinguishing trends between the four classes among the non-REE impurity data in their analysis as well.
In Phase 2, teams were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which three barrels of UOC were found out of regulatory control. In Phase 2a teams were asked whether the material in each of the barrels shared a consistent provenance with either of the other two barrels. All teams submitting reports (22 out of 22) found that unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 shared a common provenance, and that unknown 1005 was not consistent with either unknown 53023 or 8615-OSF-1. Several teams additionally noted that while unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 shared a consistent provenance, they were not from the same sample; that is, their provenance was consistent, but not identical. These reported findings are in accord with the intended design of this part of the exercise.
The details and specificity of the reports varied. Some teams provided summary findings with minimal discussion of how they reached their conclusions, while others provided greater detail as to their methodologies and underlying thought processes.
Phase 2a: rare earth element (REE) data
Most (19 of 22) teams explicitly noted the use of chondrite normalized REE data in their analysis, and others may have done so as well, but not noted this overtly in their report. The main reason some may not have utilized REE data seems to be the large amount of missing data in for the unknowns among these elements. Approximately ten of the teams noted that REE data was the "main discriminant fingerprint," and provided valuable information as to both origin and history.
Teams found that chondrite normalized REE patterns for unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 showed significant similarity in pattern, although the REE concentration for unknown 53023 was about a factor of two lower than unknown 8615-OSF-1. Teams determined that unknown 1005 was markedly different from the other two unknowns, and thus was not of consistent provenance. Most teams made explicit reference to the Eu anomaly in this regard, which is illustrated in a representative submission as shown in Fig. 1 below.
Several teams also cited REE data comparison in the conclusion that unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 were of consistent provenance but not from the same sample. As evidence, teams noted that the normalized values of REE of 8615-OSF-1 sample were approximately twice that of sample 53023, the missing Gd content for unknown 8615-OSF-1, and the variation in the Sr and Ni content between the two.
Phase 2a: non-rare earth element elemental concentrations
The use of non-REE impurity data was explicitly cited by 13 of 22 teams in their analysis, which was all in conjunction with REE analysis and represented the elemental comparison in a variety of different ways. Many teams observed that the uranium concentration of unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 were similar, while unknown 1005 was slightly lower. A representative plot submitted by one team is shown in Fig. 2 .
Phase 2a: multivariate analysis (MVA)
The vast majority of teams employed MVA techniques. In Phase 2a, teams primarily employed principal component analysis (PCA), a method applying orthogonal transformations to convert a set of possibly correlated variables, in this case the analytes, into a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables which are referred to as principal components. The first principal component expresses the largest degree of variance in the data, and each successive principal component has the greatest variance while remaining orthogonal to the prior components. Teams that employed PCA in Phase 2a observed that principal components plots generated overlapping clusters for unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1, while the cluster for unknown 1005 was distinct and separated in PCA space. Additional discussion of MVA techniques will be addressed in the context of Phase 2b.
Phase 2a: relative standard deviation (RSD) analysis
Three reporting teams employed a coefficient of variation analysis as a way to determine whether different pairings of two of the three sets of data suggested consistent provenance. The standard deviation of each element represented in the Library dataset was calculated. Averages of the four RSDs were then used to compare the relative differences between pairings of unknowns. Scores were assigned that ignored missing data. For example, one team awarded three points to results within one-RSD, two points to results within two-RSDs, one point to results within three-RSDs, and no points to results greater than three-RSDs. These results were then tallied for each pairing of unknowns. The results of such an approach are given in Table 1 . The common provenance of sample 53023 and 8615-OSF-1, referenced as unknowns 1 and 2 in Table 1 , is demonstrated by the large number of elemental comparisons that fell within one or two standard deviations, #3 and #2 in the Summary Data columns. Likewise, the dissimilarity of sample 1005, referenced as unknown 3 in Table 1 , is shown by the last number of elemental comparisons with the other two samples falling outside of three standard deviations, #0 in the Summary Data columns. 
Summary of Phase 2a findings
An unattributed summary of the Phase 2a responses from teams is given in Table 2 . The findings that exercise organizers anticipated is given in the first row in bold: Specifically, (a) unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 are consistent with each other, and (b) unknown 1005 was not consistent with the other two unknowns. While employing a variety of different analytical methods, often in combination, all responding teams (22 of 22) came to the same findings on questions (a) and (b).
In Phase 2b, teams were asked whether each of the three unknown samples were consistent with one of the four classes in their model Library. The responses to this prompt were the most varied in terms of findings, and reports did not always elucidate the methods used to reach conclusions. Teams used a variety of methods to interrogate the data for the unknowns and conduct a comparative analysis with the affinities represented in their model NNFL. In addition to the methods previously noted, a few teams additionally employed box plots, linear discriminant analysis (LDA), Random Forest, and other techniques.
Phase 2b: rare earth element (REE) data
Chondrite-normalized rare earth elemental comparison appears to have been used by the majority, if not all, of reporting teams. A representative and instructional plot is shown in Fig. 3 , in which samples 53023, 8615-OSF-1 and 1005 are, respectively, coded as unknowns 1, 2 and 3. The Eu anomaly and slope across all elements exhibited by unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 was also present in affinity IAB. None of the other affinities displayed the Eu anomaly. Teams cited this as the primary evidence in concluding that 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 share a common provenance with affinity IAB. Many noted that this conclusion was stronger with 53023 than with 8615-OSF-1 due to slight differences in Y concentrations and the missing Gd signature. Many found that the third unknown, 1005, shared no similarity in terms of specific features or slope to any other affinity, leading most teams to conclude it was extremely unlikely to share a common provenance with any known affinity in the model NNFL. However, as suggested in Fig. 3 , some teams noted that the REE pattern of 1005 bore some similarity to OIB for the lighter REEs and to MORB for the heavier REEs, which led teams to note a potential common provenance. The pattern similarities were purposefully infused by exercise organizers as a design challenge to potentially lead to misidentification of sample 1005 with one of the UOC classes in the model Library.
Phase 2b: non-rare earth element elemental concentrations
Results here were similar to REE concentration comparative analysis and the reported findings were consistent across teams. Teams found that 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 were of consistent provenance as affinity IAB with stronger confidence for 53023 than with 8615-OSF-1 due to slight differences in K, Ni, Nb, Sr and Zr concentrations, as expected due to exercise design. A plot submitted by a team employing radar plots to visualize the elemental concentrations for 53023 and 8615-OSF-1, referenced as UA and UB in the plots respectively, is shown in Fig. 4 . In general, unknown 1005 was not found to be consistent with any affinity by this method, as illustrated by a sample radar plot in Fig. 5 .
Phases 2b: principal component analysis using REE concentrations
Unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 were found to be consistent with the IAB affinity by teams employing chondrite-normalized PCA REE concentrations. Both unknowns fell within the known IAB sample points as demonstrated by a representative plot in Fig. 6 , while teams found that 53023 was consistently closer to the center of the IAB cluster than unknown 8615-OSF-1, giving relatively higher confidence. Most teams found that unknown 1005 did not lie within the most distant scattered points for any affinity in the model NNFL, however, approximately five teams determined that unknown 1005 lay within the OIB, MORB or ZCRFB clusters. This suggests that, by this method, it was possible that 1005 was consistent with those affinities. One team suggested that this consistency was sufficient to report a consistent provenance with affinity OIB by this method.
Phases 2b: principal component analysis using non-REE concentrations
Teams using this method generally found that unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 were of consistent provenance as the IAB affinity and that unknown 1005 was not consistent with any of the four affinities. Linear discriminant analysis (LDA) was also utilized and produced similar results. Since nonrare earth elements provided far less discrimination than rare earth elements, however, this method in isolation could lead to possible correlations of unknowns with certain affinities, which were unintended in exercise design. A comparison of Fig. 7 , employing PCA for trace element data, and the prior Fig. 6 , employing PCA for REE, demonstrates this point as unknown sample 52023 labelled as "unknown 1" in the Figures, appears to be consistent with the IAB, OIB, and ZCRFB affinities, and inconsistent with MORB. Table 3 represents a method-by-method summary of findings reported in Phase 2b. "No" indicated teams did not find that method as suggesting a given unknown was of consistent provenance with a given affinity; "Possible" means a method found the unknown was possibly consistent with an affinity based on that method alone; and "Yes" indicates the method suggested the unknown was consistent with an affinity. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of teams reaching this finding. Where there are no numbers, all 22 reporting teams reached the finding. Some reports did not provide sufficient detail to make a determination. The intent embedded in the design of Phase 2b was that (a) unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 were of common provenance with the IAB affinity in the model NNFL, and (b) unknown 1005 was not consistent with any of the four affinities represented in the model Library.
Summary of Phase 2b findings
The Phase 2b summary results in Table 3 reflect the challenges built into the design of the exercise and illustrate a key attribute regarding NNFLs. Regarding the design of the exercise, all teams identified unknowns 53023 and 8615-OSF-1 as being of common provenance as UOC class IAB in their model Libraries, albeit with generally less confidence Unknown 1005, which was not of common provenance with any class in the model Library, was designed to present the greatest challenge because aforementioned methods applied in isolation could suggest a provenance that other methods would not confirm. This challenge was borne out in exercise play. In general, teams that identified unknown 1005 as consistent with an affinity in the model NNFL appear to have utilized one comparative method. In eight cases, it was difficult to determine whether a team was reporting a provenance match as a confident finding, or a possible finding worthy of further examination. In such cases, best possible inferences were made.
This further supports the most recent definition of a NNFL, which posits that a NNFL is not simply a standalone repository of data and information, but requires careful interpretation and utilization by subject matter experts to be effective and of greatest utility in providing support to an investigation involving MORC.
Conclusion
The ongoing Galaxy Serpent suite of exercises have proven useful in providing a cost effective platform to illustrate the efficacy of NNFLs as a tool in support of an investigation involving R/N material. The exercises have been beneficial in maturing the concept of NNFLs, building and refining capabilities among participant teams in organizing Library data for different material types, and demonstrating the utility of a Library in answering investigative questions and providing leads in support of a case involving nuclear or other radioactive material found out of regulatory control. At least two participant teams have developed indigenous Library capabilities based on their experiences in the Galaxy Serpent exercises [21, 22] .
The third version of the exercise, utilizing surrogate UOC data, provided critical insights for repurposing and organizing existing data, identifying key discriminators, and dealing with "real-world" data characteristics such as sparse or missing data. Teams employed a variety of technical methods of varying degrees of sophistication to reach consistent conclusions. The exercise also illustrated the efficacy of NNFLs, informed by subject matter expertise, in drawing inferences regarding the self-consistency of three UOC unknowns and their provenance by comparative analysis with affinities in a model NNFL. Additionally, in Phase 2b it was found that relying on one isolated methodology, for example comparative analysis of non-REE concentrations, could suggest a consistency with an affinity in the model NNFL that other methods would not confirm.
NNFLs can play a vital role in investigative efforts that involve R/N material out of regulatory control. The Galaxy Serpent exercise demonstrates that there is a lot of activity in the nuclear forensics community thinking about data analytics and ways to apply these tools to answer investigative questions. The exercises have proved successful in their objectives and been beneficial to participants. A fourth version of the exercise, which will utilize a different R/N material than the prior three iterations, is under development and will be conducted Fall 2019-Spring 2020.
